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The Ontological Status of Bodies in Leibniz (Part I)* 
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On sait bien que Leibniz caractérise les corps de deux manières apparemment incompatibles. 
D’un côté, il affirme qu’un corps est un phénomène réel ou bien fondé. De l’autre, il soutient 
qu’un corps est un agrégat qui possède une réalité empruntée aux substances qu’il contient. Dans 
cet essai je tâche de défendre une explication du rapport qui existe, selon Leibniz, entre ces deux 
conceptions des corps, une explication qui montre que ces conceptions sont compatibles et, en 
fait, complémentaires. Dans la première partie de cet essai, je tente de montrer surtout que Robert 
Adams et Donald Rutherford ont tort de croire que l’une de ces conceptions peut se concilier avec 




Leibniz’s interpreters have observed that he seems to offer two incompatible accounts of 
what bodies are. In some texts, he characterizes bodies as real or well-founded phenomena—that 
is to say, as the representational contents of certain perceptions. Thus, in a letter of 30 June 1704 
to Burchard De Volder, Leibniz writes that “matter and motion are not substances or things so 
much as they are the phenomena of perceivers, the reality of which is situated in the harmony of 
perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers” (GP II, 270; LDV, 3061). 
In other texts, however, Leibniz claims that every body is an aggregate of substances, and that the 
reality of such an aggregate is derived entirely from its constituents. Thus, in a text of 1690, he 
states that a “body is not a substance but substances, or an aggregate of substances” (“Communi-
cata ex disputationibus cum Fardella” (henceforth, “Fardella”), A VI, 4, 1670; AG, 1052), while in 
another text of 1686 he declares that an aggregate “has only as much reality as there is in its 
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1 LDV = The Leibniz–De Volder Correspondence, trans. P. Lodge, New Haven – London 2013. 




ingredients” (draft of Leibniz’s letter of 28 Nov./8 Dec. to Arnauld, A II, 2, 115; LA, 883). In short, 
Leibniz seems to characterize a body both as the representational content of a perception and as a 
collection of substances. And these two accounts of body certainly seem, at least, to be incon-
sistent. 
Although at least one of Leibniz’s interpreters has claimed that these two accounts of body 
are altogether irreconcilable, and that they belong, in fact, to two distinct and incompatible theo-
ries of body that were concurrently developed by Leibniz,4 other interpreters have claimed that 
these accounts are consistent or at least (with some tinkering) complementary. Among these in-
terpreters, some have favoured the well-founded phenomena account of body over the aggregate 
account, while yet finding some sort of place for the aggregate account within the same system or 
theory. More specifically, these scholars have argued that for Leibniz bodies are, strictly speak-
ing, well-founded phenomena or the representational contents of perceptions; the kind of aggre-
gate with which Leibniz (inaccurately) sometimes also identifies body is, by contrast, a collection 
of simple substances that serves as the extra-mental object of a perception which has a body as its 
representational content.5 Motivating this view, in part, is the idea that Leibniz’s idealism, like 
Berkeley’s, makes it impossible for bodies to be anything other than representational contents; 
where Leibniz differs from Berkeley is in his insistence that the phenomena with which bodies 
 
3 LA = The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, trans. by H. T. Mason, intro. by G. H. R. Parkinson, Man-
chester 1967. 
4 See G. A. Hartz: Leibniz’s Final System, London – New York 2007.  
5 Proponents of this view include B. Russell: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London 
21937, pp. 104-107, N. Rescher: The Philosophy of Leibniz, Ch. 7, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967, Ch. 7, C. D. 
Broad: Leibniz: An Introduction, ed. C. Lewy, London 1975, pp. 90-92, S. Brown: Leibniz, Sussex 1984, pp. 
139-43, and B. Mates: The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language, New York – Oxford 1986, p. 
41, pp. 204f. To this list, one might add N. Jolley: “Leibniz and Phenomenalism”, in: Studia Leibnitiana 
XVIII/1 (1986), pp. 38-51. Jolley, however, suggests that there is a distinction in Leibniz between (i) ag-
gregates of substances and (ii) beings by aggregation that result from monads. On his interpretation, 
the latter, but not the former, are phenomena or perceptions, according to Leibniz. Depending, then, 
on whether Jolley holds that Leibniz normally has (ii) in mind when speaking of aggregates of sub-
stances, his position might be grouped with those of Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford (to be dis-
cussed next), inasmuch as he would, on this reading, hold, as they do, that one and the same thing can 
be called, according to Leibniz, both a phenomenon and an aggregate of substances. 
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are to be identified are well-founded: they are the representational contents of perceptions that 
have substantial things (sc. aggregates of substances) as their extra-mental objects. 
Others, arguing for the consistency of Leibniz’s two characterizations of bodies, have al-
leged that these characterizations apply equally to the same things. Prominent among such inter-
preters are Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford. According to Adams, both the aggregates and 
the phenomena with which Leibniz identifies bodies are representational contents.6 That is, the 
aggregates with which Leibniz identifies bodies, and which are said by him to have a reality de-
rived wholly from the substances that figure in them, exist objectively in the mind. This is so, ac-
cording to Adams, because Leibniz holds: (1) that relations are ideal, (2) that an aggregate neces-
sarily possesses some sort of unity, and (3) that the unity of an aggregate is based essentially on 
relations obtaining among the members of an aggregate. From this it follows, Adams claims, that 
(4) the unity of an aggregate exists only objectively in a mind that apprehends all the members of 
that aggregate. In addition, Adams argues that Leibniz’s commitment to the principle that ‘being’ 
and ‘one’ are “equivalent” (ens et unum convertuntur) leads him to hold (5) that what has its unity 
only in the mind likewise has its being only in the mind. Thus, since (4) the unity of an aggregate 
exists only objectively in a mind, it follows (6) that aggregates themselves exist only objectively in 
the mind. And this is so, according to Adams, notwithstanding the fact that these aggregates are 
understood by Leibniz to be aggregates of real, perceiver-independent beings.7 On Adams’ inter-
pretation, therefore, Leibniz’s two accounts of body are not merely consistent; on his view, “Leib-
niz thought that bodies are only phenomena precisely because they are aggregates of substances.”8 
Although Rutherford, like Adams, holds that for Leibniz one and the same thing can be both 
a well-founded phenomenon and an aggregate of substances that possesses a reality derived 
 
6 R. Adams: Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Oxford 1994, Ch. 9. 
7 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (see previous note), pp. 245-6. See especially p. 246: 
“Leibniz’s claim is that aggregates have their unity, and therefore their being, only in the mind, and 
that this is true even of an aggregate of real beings” (my emphasis).  
8 Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (see note 6) p. 219. 
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wholly from its constituents, his view differs from that of Adams in important respects.9 Accord-
ing to Rutherford, although Leibniz occasionally speaks like a phenomenalist, he more com-
monly uses the term ‘phenomenon’ to refer, not to a perception, or to the representational content 
of a perception, but to any sort of entity that depends for its existence on the perceiving activity 
of some mind. This is crucial to Rutherford’s account, for although he rejects Adams’s contention 
that Leibniz takes an aggregate of substances to be something that exists objectively in the mind, 
he still holds that for Leibniz an aggregate depends for its existence on the activity of some per-
ceiver—among other things, on the simultaneous perception, by some mind, of all the substances 
that figure in the aggregate. This is so, Rutherford claims, because Leibniz understands an aggre-
gate to be possessed essentially of an ideal or mind-manufactured unity that is itself based on, or 
constituted by, ideal relations obtaining among the members of the aggregate.10 In other words, 
according to Rutherford, Leibniz understands an aggregate to be some sort of hybrid of real and 
ideal elements—a hybrid of substances, on the one hand, and ideal relations, on the other. In-
deed, for this reason Rutherford denies that Leibnizian aggregates “are merely mental or imagi-
nary things.”11 They are, rather, “semi-mental.”12 Moreover, this conception of an aggregate is, 
according to Rutherford, the foundation of a distinction that Leibniz draws between bodies and 
the matter out which they are composed: while a body is a collection of monads that possesses 
ideal unity, the matter of a body is just monads, monads together serving as “an inherently plural 
mass, from which bodies are composed.”13 Accordingly, Rutherford argues, although Leibniz (at 
 
9 D. Rutherford: “Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz’s Later Philosophy,” in: Studia 
Leibnitiana XXII/1 (1990), pp. 11-28, idem: “Leibniz’s Analysis of Multitudes and Phenomena into Uni-
ties and Reality,” in: Journal of the History of Philosophy XXVIII/4 (1990), pp. 525-552, idem: “Leibniz and 
the Problem of Monadic Aggregation,” in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie LXXVI/1 (1994), pp. 65-
90, idem: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge 1995, Ch. 8, idem: “Leibniz as Idealist,” in: 
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy IV (2008), pp. 141-190.  
10 In fact, on Rutherford’s interpretation, all aggregates depend for their existence, according to Leib-
niz, on God. God’s apprehension of certain relations obtaining among monads is what determines the 
grouping of monads into aggregates. See Rutherford, “Leibniz and the Problem of Monadic Aggrega-
tion” (see previous note). 
11 Rutherford, “Leibniz and the Problem of Monadic Aggregation” (see note 9), p. 71. 
12 Rutherford, “Leibniz as Idealist” (see note 9) p. 176. 
13 Rutherford, “Leibniz as Idealist” (see note 9), p. 143. 
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least in his later years) is a “substance idealist” (i.e., holds that all substances are mind-like be-
ings), he is also, at the same time, a “matter realist,” inasmuch as he holds that the matter out of 
which bodies are composed is real and exists independently of its being perceived.14 
In Part I of this paper, I shall argue that Adams and Rutherford are wrong to think that for 
Leibniz one and the same thing can be both a phenomenon and an aggregate of substances that 
possesses a reality wholly derived from its constituents. That is, against Rutherford, I shall argue 
that when Leibniz goes from the claim that bodies are aggregates to the conclusion that bodies 
are phenomena, the phenomena he has in mind are representational contents, and not hybrids of 
real and ideal elements. Against Adams, I shall argue that when Leibniz characterizes a body as 
an aggregate possessed of a reality derived wholly from its ingredients,15 he has in mind a per-
ceiver-independent collection of substances that is nothing over and above those substances. In 
Part II of this paper, moreover, I shall propose and defend a different way of understanding the 
relation between Leibniz’s two, ostensibly inconsistent accounts of body. On my view, as on 
those of Rutherford and Adams, what primarily and immediately motivates Leibniz to claim that 
a body is a real or well-founded phenomenon is not a commitment to idealism, but rather a 
 
14 Rutherford is not the only interpreter to adopt this basic strategy in trying to reconcile Leibniz’s 
apparently competing characterizations of body. For example, Daniel Garber endorses a view not un-
like Rutherford’s. According to Garber, the phenomena with which Leibniz identifies bodies in the 
1680s and 90s are aggregates of corporeal substances (rather than simple substances, as on Rutherford’s 
account), but not perceptions or representational contents. Like Rutherford, that is, Garber holds that a 
Leibnizian aggregate counts as a phenomenon only in the sense that it depends for its existence on 
someone’s conceiving of its constituent substances as together forming a single thing. See D. Garber: 
Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford 2009, pp. 292-96. Garber calls this view of aggregates as phe-
nomena “aggregate phenomenalism.” Paul Lodge has also advanced an account of the relevant phe-
nomena not unlike Rutherford’s. See P. Lodge: “Leibniz’s Notion of an Aggregate,” in: British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy IX/3 (2001), pp. 467-86, as well as Section 9 of his introduction to LDV (see 
note 1), especially pp. lxvii-lxviii and lxxx-lxxxiv. Peter Loptson and Richard Arthur agree with Ruth-
erford at least in holding that the real or well-founded phenomena with which Leibniz identifies bod-
ies are not to be understood as the representational contents of perceptions. See P. Loptson and R. T. 
W. Arthur: “Leibniz’s Body Realism: Two Interpretations,” in: The Leibniz Review XVI (2006), pp. 1-41. 
15 The qualification ‘possessed of a reality derived wholly from their ingredients’ is important here, 
for I will show that Leibniz does sometimes uses the term ‘aggregate’ and related expressions (e.g., 
‘being by aggregation’) to refer to something that exists only objectively in the mind. I shall also argue, 
however, that an aggregate of this sort does not, according to Leibniz, possess a reality derived or bor-
rowed from substances.  
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commitment to the principle that real or genuine unity is a necessary attribute of every real being, 
or that “what is not truly one being is not truly a being” (to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, A II, 2, 186; 
AG, 86). I part ways with Rutherford and Adams, however, when it comes to Leibniz’s under-
standing of the consequences of this principle. My claim is that for Leibniz it follows from this 
principle that if some being, A, exists objectively in a perceiver by virtue of being the representa-
tional content of a perception, but this perception does not after all have a single being as its ex-
tra-mental object—because it has instead a plurality of beings as its extra-mental object—then A, 
understood as a being (i.e., as a single thing), is not a real being, but a mere being of reason, per-
ception, or imagination—i.e., what Leibniz calls a real or well-founded phenomenon. Otherwise put, 
A has only esse objectivum, and not esse formale or reale—i.e., only a mental existence, and not an 
extra-mental one. For when it comes to the perception that has A as its representational content, 
there is no single real being that this perception is a perception of, even if this perception is con-
nected in a rule-governed way with other perceptions, within both the perceiver and all other 
perceivers, and also has some foundation in reality by virtue of the fact that it is, in the final anal-
ysis, the perception of a plurality of real beings. When, therefore, Leibniz claims that a body is an 
aggregate of substances and therefore a phenomenon, he means to say that what we call a body is 
not, in reality, a single being, but many beings, with the result that there is nothing more to the 
body, understood as a being (i.e., as a single thing), than a creature of the perceiving mind—
something with a mental existence, to be sure, but not a real or extra-mental one.16  
On this account, Leibniz does not think that one and the same thing can be both a phenome-
non and an aggregate of substances that somehow borrows its reality from those substances. Leib-
niz’s willingness to characterize bodies both as aggregates and as phenomena is instead usefully 
understood by appeal to a long-established way of speaking common to his philosophical prede-
cessors and contemporaries. After all, philosophers in the medieval and early modern periods 
 
16 I know of only one scholar who has endorsed this understanding of the relation between Leibniz’s 
claim that bodies are aggregates and his further claim that bodies are well-founded phenomena. See D. 
L. M. Baxter: “Corporeal Substances and True Unities”, in: Studia Leibnitiana XXVII/2 (1995), pp. 157-
84, especially pp. 162-66.  
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often draw a distinction between how a thing stands quoad nos (with respect to us) and how it 
stands a parte rei (as it is in itself or in reality). In fact, Leibniz himself explains in one text that an 
unum per se is “what is one a parte rei” (“De notionibus omnia quae cogitamus continentibus,” A 
VI, 4, 401 (1680-85?)). Accordingly, when he says, as he sometimes does, that a body is one only 
per accidens (see, e.g., “Antibarbarus physicus pro philosophia reali,” GP VII, 344; AG, 319 (1710-
16?)), he is to be understood as claiming that a body is not one a parte rei, the clear implication be-
ing that the body is one only quoad nos. Much the same is true, I claim, when Leibniz asserts that a 
“body is not a substance, but substances or an aggregate of substances” (“Fardella”, A VI, 4 1670; 
AG, 105 (1690)).17 His point, again, is that a body is not one a parte rei; it is, rather, a mere plurality 
of substances. And from this it follows, according to him, that a body, understood as a being (i.e., 
as one thing), is nothing more than an imaginary being—i.e., a phenomenon or being of percep-
tion, albeit one with a foundation in reality.  
This understanding of what Leibniz means when he declares that bodies are aggregates and 
therefore phenomena has significant and far-reaching consequences. These consequences will be 
discussed at some length in Part II of this paper, where my concern will be to elaborate on my 
positive account and offer arguments in support of it. Here in Part I, my primary task will be 
simply to show that Adams and Rutherford are wrong to think that for Leibniz one and the same 
thing can be both a phenomenon and an aggregates of substances that possesses a reality derived 
from those substances. However, in order to accomplish this, I must briefly mention the two con-
sequences of the account to be defended here.  
First, it is well known that Leibniz sometimes claims that all substances are monads—i.e., 
simple or soul-like substances. In some texts, however, Leibniz seems to commit himself to the 
existence of corporeal substances—i.e., substances composed of body and soul. This apparent in-
consistency in the Leibnizian doctrine has received much attention from Leibniz scholars. But 
 
17 For Adams and Rutherford, by contrast, although the claim that a body is an aggregate of sub-
stance might be taken to imply that a parte rei a body is nothing over and above its constituent sub-
stances, it is not itself a claim about what a body is a parte rei. For on their understanding of Leibniz, 
aggregates do not have a perceiver-independent existence.  
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what is less frequently noted is that Leibniz himself equivocates in his use of the term ‘body’: 
sometimes Leibniz uses this term to refer to something that corporeal substances (assuming they 
exist) have, but not to something that corporeal substances are. In other words, Leibniz sometimes 
uses the term ‘body’ in a restricted sense according to which corporeal substances (assuming they 
exist) do not count as bodies. At other times, however, he uses the term ‘body’ in a more inclusive 
sense, according to which corporeal substances (assuming they exist) count as bodies.18 This fact 
is important, for in the former sense, but not the latter, the claim that a body is an aggregate of 
substances is not at all surprising, since Leibniz is consistent in holding that the body of a corpo-
real substance is invariably an aggregate of substances.19 In the narrower sense of ‘body,’ then, 
the conclusion that all bodies are well-founded phenomena does not by itself imply idealism or 
the rejection of corporeal substances. Indeed, it’s worth noting that Leibniz can be found claiming 
that the body of a corporeal substance is an aggregate of corporeal substances (see, e.g., Leibniz’s 
letter to Burnett, undated, GP III, 260; AG, 289). 
Second, since, on the account presented here, Leibniz’s claim that a body is an aggregate of 
substances—more specifically, an aggregate whose reality is derived wholly from the substances 
which figure in it—is to be understood as a claim about what a body is a parte rei or in reality, for 
Leibniz such an aggregate can only be a collection of substances which is nothing over and above 
those same substances. For if a collection is to be something over and above its constituents, there 
must be relations among these constituents that give rise to some sort of unity of the collection. 
But for Leibniz all relations—excepting, presumably, those relations of dependence that each 
 
18 See R. Sleigh, Jr.: Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence, New Haven – London 
1990, p. 103. For texts in which Leibniz uses the term ‘body’ in a broad sense, see his letter of 28 Nov./8 
Dec. to Arnauld 1686, A II, 2, 121-2; AG, 80, his letter of 12 August 1711 to Bierling, GP VII, 501-2, and 
his letter of 24 January 1713 to Des Bosses, GP II, 473; LDB, 313. Texts in which Leibniz uses the term 
‘body’ in the narrow sense are to be found in abundance in Leibniz’s philosophical writings—e.g., 
when he speaks of the union of body and soul in a corporeal substance. 
19 Although Leibniz holds that a corporeal substance (composed of a soul and an organic body) pos-
sesses genuine or per se unity, he also holds that the organic body of a corporeal substance does not, 
but is instead a mere aggregate of substances. See, for example, his letter of 4 November 1715 to 
Remond, GP III, 657: “secondary matter (for example, an organic body) is not a substance […] but a col-
lection [amas] of many substances, like a pond full of fish or a herd of sheep.” 
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creature bears directly to its creator—are ideal, which implies that there can be no relations that 
obtain a parte rei among the constituents of an aggregate. And so the aggregates which bodies are 
said to be a parte rei can possess no unity whatsoever, being instead collections that are nothing 
over and above their constituents. 
 
1. Well-Founded Phenomena 
 
In this section, I argue, against Donald Rutherford and others,20 that when Leibniz goes from 
the claim that bodies are aggregates to the conclusion that bodies are real or well-founded phe-
nomena, the phenomena he has in mind are invariably conceived by him to be the representa-
tional contents of perceptions that have aggregates of substances as their extra-mental objects.  
When Leibniz claims that bodies are phenomena, he often makes it perfectly clear that he 
understands the phenomena at issue to be the representational contents of perceptions. Consider, 
first of all, some important passages from Leibniz’s correspondence with Barthélémy Des Bosses. 
One of the more interesting questions that this correspondence raises is whether Leibniz’s mon-
adological metaphysics can accommodate corporeal substances and, if not, in what way it might 
be modified in order for it to do so. With respect to the first question, in the draft of his letter of 
14 February 1706 to Des Bosses, Leibniz seems to confess that his system cannot account for the 
existence of corporeal substances because it lacks the resources to explain how infinitely many 
monads can be united in such a way as to form a single being, i.e., a composite or corporeal sub-
stance. As Leibniz puts it: 
The union I find some difficulty explaining is that which joins the different simple sub-
stances or monads existing in our body with us, such that it makes one thing from them; 
nor is it sufficiently clear how, in addition to the existence of individual monads, there 
may arise a new existing thing, unless they are joined by the bond of a continuous thing 
that the phenomena display to us. (LDB, 2321) 
 
 
20 See note 14 above. 




It is possible to understand Leibniz’s many remarks on soul-body union as addressing the ques-
tion of how one thing, the human being’s soul or dominant monad, combines with another thing, 
the human being’s body, in order to form a third thing distinct from both. But notwithstanding 
the suggestion in many texts that the problem concerns the union of two things, the soul and the 
body, Leibniz makes it clear elsewhere that he considers a living thing’s body to be a mere aggre-
gate.22 Thus, the union spoken of in the passage just quoted is (as Leibniz’s talk of different mon-
ads existing in our body would in any case suggest) a union, not of two things, but of infinitely 
many things, i.e., of infinitely many substances. What Leibniz finds “some difficulty explaining” 
here, then, is how the dominant monad of a human being can come together with the infinitely 
many monads in that human being’s body in order to form a single, new composite thing or be-
ing—i.e., a corporeal substance.  
Although the quoted passage from the draft of his letter of 14 February 1706 to Des Bosses 
was deleted in the draft itself, the question of how infinitely many monads can be combined to 
form a genuine composite substance comes into focus later in the correspondence, on the occa-
sion of Des Bosses’s asking how Leibniz’s metaphysical system can accommodate the Roman 
Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (GP II, 388; LDB, 149 (letter of 6 September 1709)). By way 
of reply, in his letter of 8 September 1709, Leibniz suggests that if Des Bosses wishes to hold that 
in the Eucharist the accidents of the bread remain without inhering in a substantial subject,23 then 
one might suppose that, after the monads constituting the bread are replaced by monads consti-
tuting Christ’s body, the derivative forces present in the bread before transubstantiation remain 
after transubstantiation, with the result that there is no change in the phenomena. Not surpris-
ingly, this explanation is found wanting by Des Bosses, since Leibniz normally maintains that de-
rivative forces are modifications of the primitive forces that belong to, and are present in, mon-
ads. As a result, it is difficult to see how derivative forces could possibly remain when the 
 
22 See, e.g., Leibniz’s letter of 28 Nov./8 Dec. 1686 to Arnauld, A II, 2, 119; LA, 92-93. 
23 As Des Bosses notes in his reply of 18 January 1710 (GP II, 396; LDB, 159), that the accidents of the 
bread abide, after transubstantiation, without a substantial subject is something on which Roman 
Catholic theologians agreed.  
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relevant primitive forces are eliminated (GP II, 396; LDB, 159 (letter of 18 January 1710)). In a let-
ter dated 2 May 1710, Leibniz seems implicitly to acknowledge the force of Des Bosses’s objection 
by taking a new tack, suggesting that the monads of the bread can, after all, remain during tran-
substantiation, transubstantiation consisting not in the replacement of certain monads by others, 
but in the advent of a new union of abiding substances (GP II, 403; LDB, 167). Apparently elabo-
rating on this very brief account, in his letter of 15 February 1712, Leibniz explains that if a corpo-
real substance is understood to be “something real beyond [praeter] monads” or simple sub-
stances, it will depend on a kind of union or unifying reality that is added to monads by God (GP 
II, 435; LDB, 225). The idea, it becomes clear, is that something absolute, and therefore substan-
tial, must be added to a collection of monads, something that confers genuine unity on the collec-
tion and thereby gives rise to some new unity or being. Leibniz explains, moreover, that as a re-
sult of the addition of this unifying reality, the primary active and passive forces of the monads 
present in the collection will be unified in such a way as to give rise to the substantial form and 
primary matter of the new corporeal substance. He cautions, however, that anything which ad-
mits of being generated in this way will also be destroyed when the relevant union ceases, “un-
less it is miraculously preserved by God” (ibid.). He also observes that the substantial form which 
arises from the union of the monadic entelechies is not to be identified with the soul of the corpo-
real substance, which Leibniz seems to identify instead with the entelechy of the dominant 
monad in the collection.  
What Leibniz says next is especially important for present purposes: 
Thus, one of two things must be said: either bodies are mere phenomena, and so extension 
also will only be a phenomenon, and monads alone will be real, but with a union supplied 
by the operation of the perceiving soul on the phenomena; or, if faith drives us to corporeal 
substances, this substance depends [consistere] on that unifying reality, which adds some-
thing absolute (and therefore substantial), albeit impermanent, to the things to be unified. 
(GP II, 435; LDB, 225-27) 
 
In this passage Leibniz presents two options: either (i) monads alone are real, or (ii) there are cor-
poreal substances. And the suggestion is that, if (i) is the case, “bodies are mere phenomena,” and 
the unity of a given collection of monads will be merely apparent, since it will be supplied by a 
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soul that perceives the collection.24 If, on the other hand, (ii) there are corporeal substances, then 
bodies—or at least some bodies—will not be mere phenomena: some collections of monads will 
possess genuine unity, i.e., a unity not supplied by a perceiving soul, and will therefore count as 
true composite substances. But the most important question that presents itself here is this: what 
does Leibniz understand by ‘phenomena’ in this passage? Does he have in mind representational 
contents, i.e., things existing only objectively in the soul of one who apprehends an infinitely 
large collection of monads? Or does he have something else in mind? The answer becomes quite 
clear a little later in the letter, after Leibniz explains that “transubstantiation must be located in 
the change” of the unifying reality—i.e., in the addition of such a unifying reality to a mere ag-
gregate of substances, or in the substitution of one such unifying reality for another. For, Leibniz 
goes on to say: 
If that substantial bond of monads were absent, then all bodies with all their qualities 
would be only well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in the mirror—in a 
word, continuous dreams that agree perfectly with one another; and in this alone would 
consist the reality of those phenomena. (GP II, 435-36; LDB, 227) 
 
Leibniz’s mention here of continuous dreams makes it abundantly clear that the phenomena with 
which all bodies are to be identified—in the event that substantial bonds and therefore corporeal 
substances do not exist—are representational contents, i.e., things existing objectively in perceiv-
ers. And his rationale is very plausibly understood in the way I claim it should be: without the 
existence of something that can confer genuine unity on a collection of monads, all bodies (in the 
more inclusive sense of ‘body’) will in reality or a parte rei be pluralities, in which case there will 
be nothing more to a body, understood as a being or single thing, than a phenomenon—i.e., an 
imaginary being or creature of perception. If, on the other hand, there are corporeal substances, 
some (though not all) perceptions that have extended things as their representational contents will 
have genuine unities (sc. unities constituted from monads), rather than pluralities, as their extra-
 
24 Notice that here Leibniz seems clearly to be using the term ‘body’ in the more inclusive of the two 
senses identified earlier. 
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mental objects.25 And so not all bodies (in the more inclusive sense of ‘body’) will be mere phe-
nomena.  
Notice, moreover, that in his letter of 20 May 1712, Des Bosses considers Leibniz’s account of 
transubstantiation, which, of course, presupposes that there are corporeal substances and there-
fore substantial bonds as well. And he makes two points relevant to the present discussion. First, 
after noting the choice offered by Leibniz in his letter—either bodies are mere phenomena, or 
there are unifying realities that confer genuine unity on collections of monads—Des Bosses dis-
misses the view that bodies are mere phenomena and observes that “it remains for us to admit 
something absolute, on which the realization [realizatio] of the phenomena depends” (GP II, 442; 
LDB, 237).26 He disagrees, however, with Leibniz’s view that this absolute thing must be a sub-
stance; he himself thinks that it should be considered an accident. Second, a little later in the let-
ter, Des Bosses returns to, and criticizes, the view that bodies are phenomena. He says: 
the common sense of men seems to understand something more in a sensible body than 
phenomena consisting in an operation of the perceiving soul [in animae percipientis opera-
tione consistentia]. And, speaking naturally, there ought to be some object distinct from the 
perception itself that corresponds to the perception; otherwise there would be no harmony. 
(GP II, 442; LDB, 239) 
 
For present purposes, the most important thing to observe about this passage is that Des Bosses 
here understands the phenomena with which Leibniz is prepared to identify bodies (if it turns 
out that there are no corporeal substances) to be things consisting in an operation of the perceiv-
ing soul. Indeed, as the second sentence of the quoted passage makes clear, Des Bosses takes 
Leibniz to be entertaining the possibility that any given body is merely an imaginary being, i.e., a 
 
25 I say “though not all” here because some perceptions that have extended things as their representa-
tional contents will have aggregates of corporeal substances as their extra-mental objects—e.g., my per-
ception of a heap of worms. According to Leibniz, if there are indeed corporeal substances, then every-
thing that is not itself a living thing—e.g., a slab of marble—is a mere aggregate of living things (see 
the draft of Leibniz’s letter of 28 Nov./8 Dec. 1686 to Arnauld, A II, 2, 115; LA, 89).  
26 In his letter of 15 February 1712 to Des Bosses, Leibniz makes it clear that the realization of the 
phenomena mentioned here by Des Bosses would go beyond their mere “agreement” (“realisatio phae-
nomenorum ultra congruentiam procedens”) (GP II, 436; LDB, 227). In other words, bodies—or some bod-
ies, at any rate—wouldn’t possess only a diminished sort of reality by virtue of a harmony obtaining 




representational content to which there corresponds no single, real being in the nature of things. 
This is important, for in Leibniz’s reply, dated six days later (i.e., 26 May 1712), he nowhere cor-
rects Des Bosses’s understanding of the proposition that bodies are mere phenomena. And his 
silence here is naturally taken to suggest that the phenomena with which he is prepared to iden-
tify bodies, if it turns out that there are no substantial bonds, are indeed representational con-
tents.  
Nor is this the only important conclusion to draw from Leibniz’s letter of 26 May 1712. For, 
with respect to Des Bosses’s suggestion that the unifying reality added to monads should be re-
garded as an accident, Leibniz states: 
If you deny that what is superadded to monads in order to make a union is substantial, 
then a body cannot be said to be a substance, for in that case it will be a mere aggregate of 
monads, and I fear that you will fall back on the mere phenomena of bodies [et vereor ne in 
mera corporum phaenomena recidas]. (GP II, 444; LDB, 241) 
 
Note that in this passage Leibniz explicitly states that, absent a substantial bond, bodies will be 
mere aggregates of monads. He also explains that, without a substantial bond, Des Bosses must, 
he fears, “fall back on the mere phenomena of bodies.” The claim here seems clearly to be that, 
absent a substantial bond, bodies are mere aggregates and therefore phenomena. But does Leib-
niz understand the phenomena at issue here to be representational contents, i.e., things that exist 
objectively in the soul? The fact that he does not correct Des Bosses’s characterization of the prop-
osition that all bodies are phenomena, which Des Bosses offers in a letter dated less than a week 
earlier, strongly suggests that he does. So also does the fact that, soon after the passage just 
quoted, Leibniz observes that monads “harmonize with each other through their phenomena, 
and not through any other intrinsic intercourse and connection” (GP II, 444; LDB, 243). By this he 
seems clearly to mean that monads harmonize with respect to the objective contents of their per-
ceptions. Moreover, a little later, in response to Des Bosses’s claim that harmony requires or pre-
supposes “some object distinct from the perception itself that corresponds to the perception”, 
Leibniz states that harmony cannot be appealed to in order to show that “there is anything other 
than phenomena in bodies,” for, he says, “it is established on other grounds that the harmony of 
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phenomena in souls does not arise from an influx of bodies, but is pre-established” (GP II, 444; 
LDB, 243; my emphasis). The characterization of the harmonizing phenomena as present “in 
souls” here also rather clearly implies that the phenomena at issue are things existing objectively 
in monads. 
In Part II of this paper I will take up the question of what Leibniz means when he says, as he 
does in one of the passages quoted above, that the phenomena with which he is prepared to iden-
tify bodies possess some sort of reality by virtue of being congruent or consistent with one an-
other. For now, I merely note that such pronouncements are sometimes taken to show that Leib-
niz endorsed, or at least flirted with, a phenomenalism like Berkeley’s, according to which bodies 
are phenomena or appearances that represent nothing substantial (such as an aggregate of sub-
stances) outside of perception. But as the texts discussed thus far make plain, at issue here, ac-
cording to Leibniz, in the choice between a commitment to corporeal substances and the view 
that all bodies are phenomena, is the question of whether some new entity can be, or should be, 
introduced into his system, an entity that can confer genuine unity on a collection of infinitely 
many monads. And the implication is that, in the absence of such an entity, all bodies (in the 
more inclusive sense of ‘body’) will be aggregates of substances and therefore well-founded phe-
nomena—i.e., well-founded phenomena to which there accrues some sort of reality by virtue of 
their agreement with one another. But talk of bodies as aggregates of substances here makes little 
sense on the supposition that Leibniz, in entertaining the possibility that bodies are mere phe-
nomena, is flirting with a phenomenalism like Berkeley’s. For there is no room in Berkeley’s phe-
nomenalism for the view that bodies are in some way aggregates of substances. In other words, 
the choice presented by Leibniz here is not a choice between corporeal substances, on the one 
hand, and a phenomenalism like Berkeley’s, on the other. At issue, rather, is the question of 
whether any perception that has an extended body as its representational content has a genuine 
unity as its extra-mental object. If not, then every body, conceived as a being or single thing, will 
be a real or well-founded phenomenon, since a parte rei every body will in this case be many 
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beings, rather than a being27. On the other hand, if some perceptions having extended things as 
their representational contents also have unities as their extra-mental objects—and this because 
certain collections of monads possess a real unity conferred on them by some sort of substantial 
bond—then not every body, conceived as a being or single thing, will be mere well-founded phe-
nomena. Some bodies, so conceived, will be real.  
In the remainder of his correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz suggests or entertains sev-
eral conceptions of corporeal substance, all different, in some way, from the conception of corpo-
real substance presented in his letters of May 1712. What remains constant in the correspondence, 
however, and in various other documents connected with it, is Leibniz’s insistence that, absent 
corporeal substances, all bodies will be no more than well-founded phenomena. Thus, in a study 
following some remarks on Des Bosses’s letter of 12 December 1712, Leibniz states: 
On the hypothesis that nothing exists except for monads, and that they are variously modi-
fied in ways that keep them in agreement with one another, it follows that all other beings 
which we conceive are only well-founded phenomena. Thus all bodies will no more be sub-
stances than the rainbow, and all corporeal qualities will be no more real than the colors of 
the rainbow. (GP, II 473; LDB, 313; my emphasis) 
 
Here it is worth noting that in at least three documents Leibniz explicitly characterizes the rain-
bow as an imaginary being.28 The import of this passage would seem to be, therefore, that if mon-
ads alone are substances, all bodies will be mental appearances or creatures of perception.  
More significant yet for a proper understanding of the phenomena with which Leibniz is 
prepared to identify bodies (absent substantial bonds) is a passage that appears at the end of 
Leibniz’s final letter to Des Bosses (29 May 1716). The passage is worth quoting in full: 
I have sometimes thought about what would have to be said by one of your order who 
wanted to do away with all composite substance, or everything realizing the phenomena, 
 
27 I here use the term ‘body’ in its more inclusive sense. 
28 See “Genera terminorum. Substantiae”, A VI, 4, 566 (1683-86?), “Divisiones”, A VI, 4, 576 (1683-
86?) and “De mundo praesenti”, A VI, 4, 1506; LOC, 283 (1684-86?). Note that in one text (see “Nota-
tiones generales”, A VI, 4, 555 (1683-85 (?))) Leibniz characterizes the rainbow as an aggregate of 
drops. I take it that this is a claim about what the rainbow is a parte rei or in reality. It is, according to 
Leibniz, when the rainbow is considered as a being (i.e., as one thing) that it counts as an imaginary 
being. For more on imaginary beings, see the next section of this paper. LOC = G. W. Leibniz: The Laby-
rinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, trans. R. T. W. Arthur, New Ha-
ven – London, 2001. 
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as though superfluous. With this assumed, the substance of body itself would consist in 
constitutive phenomena, while accidents would consist in resulting phenomena, just as the 
nature of whiteness consists in bubbles, like foam or similarly textured things, the percep-
tion of which is in us unobserved [cujus perceptio est in nobis inobservata]. But the accident of 
whiteness would consist in that observed perception by which we recognize whiteness [in 
perceptione illa observata, per quam album agnoscimus]. Accordingly, if God wanted to substi-
tute blackness for whiteness with the accidents of whiteness preserved, he would bring it 
about that all perceivers (for the truth of a phenomenon consists in the agreement of all per-
ceivers) would retain the observed perception of whiteness and its effects, that is, the per-
ception of that which results from the constitutive phenomena; but the unobserved percep-
tion would not be of foam or snowy mountains , that is, of the texture making white-
ness, but of earthworks , or of the texture making blackness. And so all observable 
perceptions of the bread would remain, but in place of the constitutive phenomena (which 
also are perceived by us, though unobservably) there would be substituted a universal per-
ception of the constitutive or unobservable phenomena of the flesh”. (GP II, 520-21; LDB, 
377-79) 
 
There is no disputing that this long passage is to be read as offering an account of what transub-
stantiation consists in on the supposition that there are no corporeal substances—i.e., on the sup-
position that all bodies (in the more inclusive sense of ‘body’) are mere phenomena. The account 
is interesting for the insight it provides into Leibniz’s theory of perception, which I cannot dis-
cuss in detail here. It is also significant inasmuch as it implies that for Leibniz there is an im-
portant connection between perception and the thesis that all bodies are phenomena—which is 
just what one would expect, granted the view that the phenomena with which Leibniz commonly 
identifies bodies are representational contents. But for present purposes, the passage is especially 
important simply because it shows that the phenomena with which Leibniz identifies bodies are 
indeed representational contents.   
Crucial to this passage’s account of what transubstantiation comes to, in the absence of cor-
poreal substances, is Leibniz’s distinction between “constitutive” and “resulting” phenomena, 
which are identified with “unobserved” (or unnoticed) and “observed” (or noticed) perceptions, 
respectively. The key to understanding this distinction is Leibniz’s view that, underlying any 
confused and conscious perception there is a more complex subconscious perception from which 
it results. Thus, according to Leibniz, a confused perception, A, with representational content γ, 
results from a subconscious perception, B, with a more complex representational content δ. 
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Moreover, Leibniz also holds that if perception B were brought to consciousness, it would more 
distinctly represent what perception A represents than perception A itself does. (Here, what A 
and B represent are not γ and δ, but some third thing, of which γ and δ are both appearances.) 
One of Leibniz’s favourite examples of this relation involves the clear but utterly confused per-
ception which he sometimes identifies with the colour green but sometimes also speaks of as the 
notion, appearance, or idea of green: on his view, this perception results from subconscious per-
ceptions that Leibniz normally identifies with the colours yellow and blue but sometimes also 
characterizes as the notions, ideas, or appearances of yellow and blue.29 According to Leibniz, the 
latter two colours, taken together, more distinctly represent what the colour green represents.30 In 
addition to this, Leibniz also thinks that some of our colour-perceptions—the basic ones, i.e., the 
ones that do not result from other colour-perceptions—result, in turn, from yet other subcon-
scious perceptions that he describes as perceptions of shapes and motions.31 Thus, in his “Medita-
tiones de cognitione, veritate, et ideis” (1684), Leibniz alleges that “when we perceive colours or 
smells, we certainly have no perception other than that of shapes and motions” (A VI, 4, 592; AG, 
27). Likewise, in his “Entretien de Philarète et d’Ariste” (1712; rev. 1715), Leibniz asserts that “the 
 
29 See Nouveaux essais, II, 2, §1, A VI, 6, 120; NE, 120, Leibniz’s letter of 4 June 1710 to Wagner, GP 
VII, 529, Leibniz to Burnett (undated), GP III, 256, “Physica scientia attributorum corporis,” A VI, 4, 
1982 (1678-81?), and Nouveaux essais, IV, 6, §7, A VI, 6, 403; NE, 403. NE = G. W. Leibniz: New Essays on 
Human Understanding, trans. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1996. 
30 Thus, while Leibniz commonly describes the colour green as a confused cognition of something, 
he says in a letter to Burnett that our notion of green (i.e., of the thing confusedly represented by the 
colour green) is distinct insofar as we have an analysis of green into yellow and blue (GP III, 256 (un-
dated)). (Leibniz’s primary concern in this letter to Burnett is to argue that distinctness comes in de-
grees. To this end, he speaks of the perception of yellow and blue as a distinct, though still somewhat 
confused, perception of green, even though his considered view is that there can be no distinct percep-
tion of a colour at all.) 
31 Of course, Leibniz characterizes shapes and motions as phenomena (“Principia logic-metaphys-
ica,” A VI, 4, 1648; AG, 34 (1689?)), or as involving something imaginary (“Discours de métaphysique” 
§12, A VI, 4, 1545; AG, 44 (1686)), which suggests that he would be ready to call one and the same 
thing both a shape and a perception of shape, or a motion and a perception of motion. Indeed, in his 
“Principia logico-metaphysica,” A VI, 4, 1648; AG, 34, Leibniz asserts that “there are no shapes a parte 
rei [non dantur figurae a parte rei].” See also Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687 to Arnauld, A II, 2, 178; LA, 
115, and his letter of August 1686 to Foucher, A II, 2, 91. 
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whiteness of foam […] comes from little bubbles which are hollow and polished like many little 
mirrors” (GP VI, 587; AG, 263). 32  
In the language employed by Leibniz in the long passage quoted above, the subconscious 
perceptions of shapes and motions from which conscious perceptions of colour result are “consti-
tutive phenomena” or “unobserved perceptions.” The confused conscious perceptions that result 
from subconscious ones are “resulting phenomena” or “observed perceptions.” And Leibniz’s 
proposal in this passage is that we ought to identify the nature of a thing with the subconscious 
perception which is the source of the conscious perception by which we normally recognize that 
thing. Thus, according to Leibniz, the nature of whiteness consists in the unconscious perception 
of shapes found in bubbles or concave mirrors, from which there results the appearance that the 
person on the street typically takes whiteness to consist in. With respect to the issue of transub-
stantiation, then, Leibniz’s suggestion here in his final letter to Des Bosses is that, if there are no 
corporeal substances, transubstantiation should be understood as a change in which the unob-
served phenomena constitutive of the bread employed in the sacrament are replaced in each per-
ceiver by the unobserved phenomena constitutive of Christ’s flesh, but without any correspond-
ing change in perceivers’ resulting phenomena. On this account, Leibniz seems to think, it is fair 
to say that the substance of the bread is replaced by the substance of Christ’s flesh, for the sub-
stance or nature of a thing consists in the phenomena constitutive of it. It also makes some sense 
to say that the accidents of the bread remain after consecration, but without inhering in the sub-
stance of Christ’s flesh, at least inasmuch as the observed phenomena that remain after the conse-
cration do not in fact result from the phenomena constitutive of Christ’s flesh. In fact, they seem, 
after consecration, no longer to result from anything, being preserved miraculously by God.33 
 
32 See S. Duarte: “Ideas and Confusion in Leibniz”, in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 
XVII/4 (2009), pp. 705-733, section 2. Cf. S. Puryear: “Leibniz’s Alleged Ambivalence About Sensible 
Qualities”, in: Studia Leibnitiana XLIV/2 (2012), pp. 229-45, note 18. 
33 See Nouveaux essais, II, 27, §23, A VI, 6, 245; NE, 245, where, envisioning the possibility that God 
might exchange the conscious perceptions of two human beings, while yet preserving their uncon-
scious perceptions, Leibniz says: “Nevertheless, it must be granted to me also that the divorce between 
the insensible and sensible worlds, i.e., between the insensible perceptions that would remain in the 
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This account of transubstantiation is certainly interesting, both in itself and for the light it 
casts on Leibniz’s theory of perception, although one might reasonably doubt whether Des 
Bosses would have approved of it. In any case, for present purposes, the important thing to no-
tice is that this account makes it abundantly clear that the phenomena with which Leibniz pro-
poses to identify bodies, should there be no corporeal substances, are perceptions or, more accu-
rately, their representational contents. The phenomena with which Leibniz commonly identifies 
bodies are, therefore, things existing objectively in perceivers.  
The same conclusion is supported by a number of several passages from the correspondence 
with De Volder. To take but one example, in his letter of 20 June 1703, Leibniz writes: 
I do not admit the action of individual substances on one another, since there appears to be 
no way by which a monad could influence a monad. But does anyone deny collision and 
impulse in the appearances of aggregates [in apparentiis aggregatorum], which are certainly 
nothing but phenomena (though founded and rule-governed)? (GP II, 251; LDV, 263) 
 
In this passage, Leibniz speaks of appearances of aggregates, and he characterizes these appear-
ances as founded and rule-governed phenomena (phaenomena fundata ac regulata). The suggestion, 
in other words, is that these appearances are none other than the well-founded phenomena with 
which he often identifies bodies. Notice, however, that since an aggregate cannot perceive, ac-
cording to Leibniz,34 the genitive ‘aggregatorum’ in the expression ‘in apparentiis aggregatorum’ 
must be an objective, rather than subjective, genitive. In other words, the passage is to be read as 
implying that bodies are the representational contents of perceptions that have aggregates of sub-
stances as their objects. What’s more, the contrast in this passage seems to be a contrast between 
what is true of monads (i.e., genuine substance), and what is true of mental appearances or phe-
nomena, and this seems clearly to point to the conclusion that the phenomena with which Leibniz 
 
same substances and the apperceptions that were exchanged, would be miraculous, as when we sup-
pose that God makes the void. For I have said above why this is not in conformity with the natural or-
der.”  
34 For “actiones sunt suppositorum” (“Discours de métaphysique” §8, A VI, 4, 1540/AG, 40), according 
to Leibniz, and an aggregate is not a suppositum, but supposita.  
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identifies bodies are the representational contents of perceptions that have aggregates as their ex-
tra-mental objects.  
In addition to all this, it is worth noting that, although Leibniz sometimes characterizes bod-
ies simply as phenomena, he frequently characterizes them as “well-founded” phenomena (phae-
nomena bene fundata) in particular. What exactly he means by a well-founded phenomenon can be 
seen by considering his claim that “matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon 
founded in things [phaenomenon fundatur in rebus],” and his further claim that “substantial unities 
are not parts, but the foundations of phenomena [fundamenta phaenomenorum]” (letter to De 
Volder, 30 June 1704, GP II, 268; LDV, 303). I take it that this is just another way of saying that 
matter or extended mass is a well-founded phenomenon. But if I am right about this, Leibniz’s 
talk of phenomena as founded in things, and his talk of substantial unities as the foundations of 
phenomena, make it clear that for him a well-founded phenomenon is a representational content 
to which there corresponds something in reality, or in re. For it is something of a scholastic com-
monplace that the content of a mental representation has a fundamentum in re or in rebus precisely 
insofar as there exists something outside the soul that answers to it. Thus, for Aquinas, the con-
cept of a chimera has no fundamentum in re, while the concept of a human being does. Indeed, for 
Aquinas a conception of the soul need not even be a likeness (similitudo) of its fundamentum in re, 
as one’s conception of a human being is.35 Thus, the concept of humanity has a fundamentum in re, 
according to Aquinas, even though there is in reality no such thing as humanity understood as 
something universal and common to all human beings: for this concept to have a fundamentum in 
re, on his view, it suffices that it result from the way the intellect understands things that do in-
deed exist outside the soul (i.e., individual human beings).36 For Leibniz, then, a well-founded 
phenomenon would seem to be a phenomenon founded in things, and a phenomenon founded in 
 
35 Cf. Nouveaux essais, II, 30, §1, A VI, 6, 263; NE, 263. 
36 See Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sententiarum, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, resp., in: Thomas Aquinas: Commento alle 
sentenze di Pietro Lombardo, ed. Roberto Coggi, Bologna 1999), pp. 230-32. See also Giraldus Odonis, 
O.F.M.: Opera Philosophica, vol. II: De Intentionibus, Critical Edition with a Study on the Medieval Intention-
ality Debate up to ca. 1350, by L. M. De Rijk, Leiden 2005), pp. 120-24. 
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things is the objective content of a perception to which there corresponds something in reality, 
outside the soul. Of course, this something need not be a unity. 
This account seems to be confirmed by the fact that in his “Animadversiones in partem gen-
eralem Principiorum Cartesianorum,” Leibniz claims that Descartes usefully did away with the 
“prejudice by which we look on heat, colours and other phenomena as certain things [res] outside 
us” (GP IV, 365; L, 390 (1692)37), and by the further fact that, in the original draft of this work, 
Leibniz goes on to add: “Nevertheless, we rightly say that colours and heat are in things [in rebus] 
when we understand them to be the foundations of these phenomena [horum phaenomenorum fun-
damenta]” (GP IV, 365, n. *; L, 411, n. 14). Leibniz seems clearly to mean by this that if we under-
stand colours and heat to be, not what the philosophically naïve take them to be, but those real 
and genuine features of bodies that are held by many philosophers to be causally responsible for 
sensations of colour and heat in us, then it is true to say that colours and heat are real or “in 
things.” This, too, shows that Leibniz understands the foundation of a phenomenon to be the ex-
tra-mental thing that corresponds to that phenomenon or mental appearance.  
Granted, then, that a well-founded phenomenon is for Leibniz a phenomenon founded on 
things, all of this clearly establishes that when he speaks of a “well-founded” phenomenon (phae-
nomenon bene fundatum) he has in mind a representational content to which there corresponds 
something existing in reality outside the soul. That this is indeed what he has in mind seems also 
to be confirmed by the fact that in his own copy of a letter of 1705 to De Volder Leibniz speaks of 
the rainbow as a “real or well-founded phenomenon” (phaenomenon reale seu bene fundatum) (GP 
II, 276; LDV, 321). For this suggests that Leibniz understands a real phenomenon to be none other 
than a well-founded one. (A number of other passages suggest the same.38) And as Leibniz makes 
 
37 L = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Leroy E. Loemker, Dordrecht – 
Boston – London, 21969. 
38 In an earlier letter to De Volder, moreover, Leibniz uses the term ‘real’ to qualify ‘phenomenon’ 
where we might reasonably have expected him to use ‘well-founded’ instead, ‘well-founded’ being the 
expression that he uses most commonly in the correspondences with Des Bosses and De Volder: “Bod-
ies, which are commonly taken for substances, are nothing but real phenomena, and are no more sub-
stances than parhelia or rainbows, and this is not something that is overturned by touch any more 
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plain in his “De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis” (A VI, 4, 1498-1504; L, 
363-66 (1683-86?)), he understands a real phenomenon to be the representational content of a per-
ception that has an extra-mental object. Indeed, the principal aim of this work is to identify crite-
ria or signs (indicia) by which one can distinguish those perceptions which have extra-mental ob-
jects from those perceptions which do not. The former perceptions are called “real” phenomena, 
the latter “imaginary” phenomena.39 For this reason, too, then, it seems clear that Leibniz under-
stands a well-founded phenomenon to be the representational content of a perception that has an 
extra-mental object. Accordingly, when Leibniz declares that bodies are aggregates and therefore 
well-founded phenomena, the phenomena at issue are correctly understood as the representa-




Even if it is granted that the real or well-founded phenomena with which Leibniz frequently 
identifies bodies are to be understood as the representational contents of perceptions, it remains 
for me to show that the aggregates with which he sometimes identifies bodies, and which are 
said by him to have a reality derived wholly from their ingredients, are collections of substances 
that are nothing over and above the genuine unities contained within them. Absent that, it might 
be argued that Adams is right to understand these aggregates as representational contents and 
 
than by sight. A monad alone is a substance; a body is substances, not a substance” (GP II, 262; LDV, 
287 (21 January 1704)). See also Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1709 to Des Bosses, in which he asserts that 
mass is a “real phenomenon” (GP II, 371; LDB, 127), Nouveaux essais, II, 21, §72, in which he asserts that 
“motion is only a real phenomenon because matter or mass, to which motion belongs, is not properly 
speaking a substance” (A VI, 6, 210; NE, 210), and Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687 to Arnauld, in 
which he states that motions are real phenomena rather than beings (A II, 2, 178; LA, 115). I would 
suggest that Leibniz’s apparent preference for ‘well-founded’ over ‘real’ has to do with the fact that 
calling phenomena “real” runs the risk of creating confusion between a phenomenon’s status as real, 
which accrues to it insofar as it is the appearance of something outside the soul, and its status as a pos-
sessor of reality, which accrues to it insofar as it harmonizes with other phenomena. Cf. P. Phemister: 
Leibniz and the Natural World, Dordrecht 2005, pp. 169-75. 
39 Leibniz distinguishes between imaginary phenomena and imaginary beings. An imaginary being 
can have a foundation in re—e.g., in a plurality of monads; by definition, an imaginary phenomenon 
cannot. Moreover, although the claim that some item is an imaginary phenomenon certainly implies 
that it is an imaginary being, according to Leibniz, the converse does not hold, since some imaginary 
beings are real or well-founded phenomena, rather than imaginary phenomena. 
Pre-publication draft 
 24 
also right to think that these aggregates are none other than the real or well-founded phenomena 
with which Leibniz also identifies bodies.  
I must grant at the outset that some of the things that Leibniz terms “aggregates” or “beings 
by aggregation” seem clearly to be representational contents or imaginary beings. I deny, how-
ever, that Leibniz conceives of aggregates, so understood, as things possessed of a reality that is 
wholly derived from genuine substances. On my view, in other words, Leibniz equivocates in his 
use of the term ‘aggregate’ and related expressions. Sometimes he uses this term to refer to a col-
lection of substances that is nothing over and above those very substances, and sometimes he 
uses it to refer to a representational content or imaginary being. The first sense, according to 
which the reality of an aggregate is derived wholly from the substances contained within it, is the 
one at work when Leibniz asserts that a “body is not a substance, but substances or an aggregate 
of substances” (“Fardella”, A VI, 4, 1670; AG, 105). The second sense, according to which aggre-
gates are phenomena or representational contents, is the one that Leibniz has in mind when he 
says that “aggregates themselves are nothing but phenomena, since besides the ingredient mon-
ads, everything else is added by perception alone” (to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716, GP II, 517; LDB, 
370). In this latter sense, I claim, an aggregate is not many beings, nor is it something that derives 
its reality wholly from genuine substances; it is, rather, an imaginary being.  
Given this equivocation in Leibniz, the fact that he sometimes uses the term ‘aggregate’ and 
related expressions to refer to something that exists only objectively in the mind is insufficient to 
support Adams’s contention that the problem of Leibniz’s ostensibly competing characterizations 
of body is to be solved by recognizing that for Leibniz an aggregate just is a phenomenon—i.e., 
just is something that exists objectively in perceivers. For, on the view to be argued for here, the 
kind of aggregate that is a phenomenon, unlike the kind of aggregate that is a mind-independent 
collection of substances, is not something that derives its reality from genuine substances. And in 
many texts the aggregates with which Leibniz identifies bodies are clearly conceived by him to 
possess a reality that is derived from the substances contained within them.  
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I will not go to great lengths to show that some of the things that Leibniz calls aggregates 
are conceived by him to exist only objectively in perceivers. That this is indeed the case is made 
abundantly clear, it seems to me, by the following passage from Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687 
to Arnauld:  
I have already said in another letter that the composite made up of the diamonds of the 
Grand Duke and of the Great Mogul can be called a pair of diamonds, but this is only a be-
ing of reason [un estre de raison]. And when they are brought closer to one another, it will be 
a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon [un estre d’imagina-
tion ou perception, c’est à dire un phenomène]. For contact, common motion, and participation 
in a common plan have no effect on substantial unity. (A II, 2, 185; LA, 121) 
 
In a draft of the letter in which this passage appears, Leibniz explicitly refers to the pair 
composed of the diamonds of the Grand Duke and Great Mogul as a “being by aggregation” (A 
II, 2, 170). As one might in any case surmise, then, the composite of the two diamonds discussed 
in this passage is understood by Leibniz to be an aggregate. Now, in this passage Leibniz first 
supposes that the diamonds of the Grand Duke and Great Mogul are situated at a great distance 
from each other, and he claims that the pair composed from them will in that case be “only a be-
ing of reason.” As traditionally understood, of course, a being of reason (ens rationis) is something 
that has only objective existence (esse objectivum), i.e., is something that exists only objectively in 
the mind.40 Nor does Leibniz differ from the tradition on this score, as he makes clear in his “De 
 
40 Indeed, many earlier philosophers held that, strictly speaking, a being of reason is not merely 
something that exists only objectively in the intellect, but also something that cannot exist in reality. On 
this view, privations, negations, and contradictory things count as beings of reason, but a golden 
mountain (say) does not. See Francisco Suárez: Disputationes metaphysicae, 54, 1, 6 in: F. Suárez: Opera 
omnia, vol. 26, ed. C. Berton, Paris 1856, p. 1016. (English translation: F. Suárez: On Beings of Reason, ed. 
J. P. Doyle, Milwaukee 1995, pp. 62-63.) However, Joachim Jungius, Logica hamburgensis, ed. Rudolf W. 
Meyer, Hamburg 1957 (first published 1638), simply claims that a being of reason is the object of a “no-
tion to which nothing real outside the intellect corresponds” (pp. 54-55). Likewise, in Johannes Micrae-
lius’s Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum, Stetini 1662, a being of reason is defined 
simply as “what does not have true esse, except by a feigning of the mind; or, what has only objective 
esse in the intellect—i.e., in a concept representing a thing that nowhere exists—insofar as it is con-
ceived by reason as a being” (p. 442). Further, in his Institutiones metaphysicae in usum academicum, Gro-
ningae 1764, Dionysius van de Wynpersse defines a being of reason as “whatever is only conceived, or 
what is not given outside a concept, such as Pegasus. It is also called a non-being by some, and to this 
class does every imaginary being belong [et refer huc omne ens imaginarium]” (p. 16). Finally, Joannes 
Hebenstreit, Philosophia prima ad mentem veterum sapientium […], Jenae 1697, p. 83, explicitly distin-
guishes between two senses of ‘being of reason’: in the strict sense, a being of reason is something that 
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Abstracto et Concreto” (A VI, 4, 987-94 (1688?)). In this work, after pointing out that there are 
things that can truly be predicated of God at one time, but not at another (e.g., “creates Adam 
and Eve”), he observes that, if all change with respect to extrinsic denominations has some foun-
dation in reality, and this in such a way that real beings serve as foundations for all predicates, it 
follows that certain things arise and perish in God. Noting that this consequence is absurd (God 
being immutable and altogether free of accidents), Leibniz concludes that all such things “should 
rather be said to be beings of reason, though having, of course, some foundation in reality” (A VI, 
4, 991).41 It seems clear, then, that in the passage from Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687, he is con-
ceiving of a being by aggregation as something that has only esse objectivum.  
In this same passage, moreover, Leibniz next supposes that the two diamonds “are brought 
closer to one another.” Under these conditions, he says, the “composite made up of the two dia-
monds” is “a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon.” The clear im-
plication is that, even when the two diamonds are brought closer together, the pair composed 
from them is still something that exists only objectively in perceivers: the proximity of the two 
diamonds does not make a single being or substance of them, so as to give the composite of them 
 
cannot exist in reality; in a looser sense, it is merely something that in fact exists only objectively in the 
intellect. 
41 See also Leibniz’s letter of 6 July 1699 to De Volder, GP II, 182; LDV, 105: “You say that the notion 
of substance is a concept of the mind, or, as they say, a being of reason. But, unless I am mistaken, the 
same can be said of every concept, which is why we say, not that concepts, but that the objects of con-
cepts, are either real or rational beings” (my emphasis). Notice that Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, 54, 
1, 5, recognizes a sense of ‘being of reason’ according to which perfections existing subjectively in the 
intellect (i.e., accidents inhering in the intellect) can be called beings of reason. But he dismisses this 
sense as irrelevant to a discussion of beings of reason, properly understood: for a being of reason, as 
normally understood, exists in the intellect not subjectively, but objectively, i.e., as an object of thought. 
Indeed, for Suárez, anything that exists subjectively in the intellect is a real being. See F. Suárez, Opera 
omnia, vol. 26 (see note 40), p. 1016. See also Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, Francofurti 
1613, p. 153: “Those things which are in the intellect as in a subject are real beings, whether you are 
thinking or not, for instance species, νοηταὶ; the act of understanding; the habit of the intellect or 
Knowledge, which is an image of the thing cognized representing the thing as existing outside the 
soul.”  
On Leibniz’s claim regarding predicates applicable to God at one time, but not at another, compare 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, Q. 13, art. 7, resp., in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII P. M. edita, vol. 4, Rome 1888, pp. 152-53. (English translation: Thomas Aquinas: Treatise on 
the Divine Nature: Summa Theologiae I, 1-13, ed. Brian Shanley, Indianapolis – Cambridge, pp. 139-40.) 
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a real existence outside the perceiver, in addition to the objective existence that it enjoys within 
the perceiver. Certainly, the expression ‘being of the imagination’ (estre de l’imagination) and 
closely related expressions—such as ‘imaginary being’ (ens imaginarium) or ‘imaginary thing’ (res 
imaginaria)—were very often used in Leibniz’s day to refer to something that exists only objec-
tively in a perceiver.42 Thus, in the second edition of his Philosophia naturalis (1654), Henricus Re-
gius, Descartes’s erstwhile disciple, mentions the view that God would be a deceiver if the bodies 
perceived by us were merely imaginary things (res imaginariae).43 For those at all familiar with 
Descartes’s Sixth Meditation, the sense here assigned to the expression ‘imaginary thing’ should 
be clear: to say of something that it is merely a res imaginaria is to say that it has no existence out-
side perception. Much the same goes for the expression ‘ens imaginarium’ when Michelangelo 
Fardella, one of Leibniz’s own correspondents, argues in his Universae philosophiae systema (1691) 
that God’s supreme veracity and ineffable goodness make it impossible for me to suppose that 
my body is an imaginary being (ens imaginarium).44 Moreover, that Leibniz himself understands 
an imaginary being to be something that has no extra-mental reality is strongly suggested by the 
fact that in one text he claims that dreams are examples of imaginary beings (A VI, 4, 1506). Fur-
ther, in a letter written near the end of his life, Leibniz tells Samuel Clarke that the “same reason 
which shows that extramundane space is imaginary proves that all empty space is an imaginary 
thing [chose imaginaire]” (GP VII, 372; LC, 23 (1716)45). And it is well known that one of Leibniz’s 
principal claims in the correspondence with Clarke is that space is ideal.46  
That Leibniz sometimes uses the term ‘aggregate’ and related expressions to refer to some-
thing that exists only objectively in the mind explains, on my view, all those passage in which he 
 
42 See the quotation from Dionysius van de Wynpersse in n. 40 above. 
43 Henricus Regius, Philosophia naturalis, editio secunda, Amstelodami 1654, p. 349. 
44 Michaele Angelo Fardella, Universae philosophiae systema, t. 1 Lugduni Battavorum, 1691, p. 525. 
45 LC = G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke: Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew, Indianapolis – Cambridge, 
2000. 
46 Note also that in a draft of Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687 to Arnauld, Leibniz states that the being 




states or implies that aggregates are in some way dependent on the mind.47 As I’ve claimed, how-
ever, Leibniz sometimes characterizes the aggregates with which he identifies bodies as things 
possessing a reality derived wholly from their constituents. And this is important, since (pace Ad-
ams) it is difficult to see how Leibniz could have held that an aggregate of substances, under-
stood as something that exists only objectively in the mind, has a reality wholly borrowed from 
genuine substances. For starters, as we’ve just seen, Leibniz refers to aggregates, understood as 
things existing in perception, as imaginary beings and beings of reason, and it is unlikely, to say 
the least, that Leibniz would have attributed substantial reality to an imaginary being or being of 
reason. The fact that he himself contrasts real beings with imaginary ones certainly suggests that 
he would not.48 In fact, part of what motivates the distinction between esse reale and esse objec-
tivum is the conviction that things which exist only objectively in the intellect lack the kind of real-
ity belonging to things that enjoy a perceiver-independent existence. Indeed, it was virtually axi-
omatic for scholastic philosophers that a being of reason is not a real being. So it is difficult to be-
lieve that Leibniz held that an imaginary being or being of reason could possess, even deriva-
tively, the formal reality of genuine substances. 
Moreover, if the reality of an aggregate of substances, according to Leibniz, is wholly bor-
rowed from the substances contained within it, this is because he holds that the reality of an ag-
gregate simply is the reality of the substances present in it. Thus we find Leibniz saying that “the 
entire reality of a society or herd”—i.e., the entire reality of an aggregate composed of persons or 
 
47 See, for example, “Definitiones notionum metaphysicarum atque logicarum”, A VI, 4, 627; LOC, 
271 (1685?), Leibniz’s letter of 30 April 1687 to Arnauld, A II, 2, 191; LA, 126-27 (1687), his letter of 6 
July 1699 to De Volder, GP II, 184; LDV, 107-9, and his letter of 20 June 1703 to the same, GP II, 250; 
LDV, 261 (1703). In all of these passages Leibniz implies that an aggregate is in some way perceiver-
dependent. But in some of them he does not make it perfectly clear that by this he means to say that an 
aggregate exists objectively in the mind. For this reason, some of these passages have been used by 
Rutherford and others to support their conception of Leibnizian aggregates as hybrids of real and 
ideal elements. I myself deny that Leibniz ever conceives of an aggregate in this way. In any case, I 
have already shown that the well-founded phenomena with which Leibniz often identifies bodies are 
not hybrids of the real and ideal, as Rutherford alleges, but the representational contents of percep-
tions. 
48 See, for example, “De mundo praesenti”, A VI, 4, 1506/LOC, 283 (1684-86?). 
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sheep—“is only in the particular men or sheep” (Leibniz of 1702 to Sophie Charlotte, GP VI, 516; 
LTS, 27449). Thus also, immediately after declaring that “matter or extended mass is nothing but a 
phenomenon founded in things, like a rainbow or a parhelion”, Leibniz adds: “and all reality be-
longs only to unities” (letter of 30 June 1704 to De Volder, GP II, 268; LDV, 303).50 It is, however, 
impossible to believe that Leibniz would ever claim that the reality of an imaginary being is none 
other than the reality of multiple real beings. To say this is to imply that the mode of being (modus 
essendi) enjoyed by genuine substances existing in reality is the same mode of being enjoyed by 
those substances insofar as they exist objectively within the mind. And this, if I am not mistaken, 
was universally taken to be false, not to say absurd. Thus, in recognition of the fact that the soul 
does not become hot when, in the process of cognition, the form of fire comes to exist within it, 
Aquinas distinguishes the natural being or existence (esse naturale) that fire has outside the soul 
from the spiritual being or existence (esse spirituale) that fire has within the soul.51 Likewise, Des-
cartes concedes in the Third Meditation that the “mode of being” (essendi modus) by which a thing 
exists objectively in the intellect is “imperfect” (AT VII, 4152). 
One might dismiss texts in which Leibniz claims or implies that the reality of an aggregate 
just is the reality of its constituent substances. And one might further insist that, even if an imagi-
nary being cannot possess formal reality or esse reale, it can nonetheless possess objective reality 
 
49 LTS = Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Correspondence, ed. & trans. Lloyd Strickland, 
Toronto 2011. 
50 See also Leibniz’s letter of 21 January 1704 to De Volder, GP II, 262/LDV, 285-7: “whatever things 
are aggregated from many are not one except by the mind, nor do they have any reality other than one 
that is borrowed, i.e., [other than the reality] that belongs to the things from which they are aggregated 
[seu rerum ex quibus aggregantur]. Therefore, third, things that can be divided into parts have no reality 
unless there are things in them that cannot be divided into parts. Indeed, they have no reality other 
than that which belongs to the unities that are in them [nullam habent aliam realitatem quam eam quae est 
Unitatum quae insunt].” Notice also that it is difficult to see how one thing (e.g., a substance) could lend 
its very own reality to another, distinct thing (e.g., a representational content). One might as well speak 
of Peter’s lending his very existence to Paul. Cf. S. Levey: “On Unity, Borrowed Reality and Multitude 
in Leibniz,” in: The Leibniz Review XXII (2012), pp. 97-134, at pp. 108-11.  
51 See, e.g., Summa theologiae, Ia, Q. 78, art. 3, corpus, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII P. M. edita, vol. 5, Rome 1889, p. 254. (English translation: Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on 
Human Nature: Summa Theologiae Ia, 75-89, ed. Robert Pasnau, Indianapolis – Cambridge 2002, p. 71.) 
52 AT = Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam & P. Tannery, Paris, 1897-1913. 
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or esse objectivum. But there is a significant problem with the suggestion that, when Leibniz as-
signs reality to certain aggregates, what he has in mind is objective reality, rather than formal re-
ality. For Leibniz never qualifies his attribution of reality to aggregates by specifying that the re-
ality at issue is objective, and this he almost certainly would have done if this were the sort of re-
ality he had in mind. This is not merely to say that Leibniz would surely have been animated, on 
at least one occasion, with a spirit of precision that led him to specify that it was objective reality, 
in particular, that he was concerned to assign to aggregates. Rather, it is to say that, if Leibniz had 
believed that aggregates possess merely objective reality, it is almost certain that he would have 
regarded it as false to assert without qualification that they possess reality, since an unqualified 
assignment of reality or esse to something is, on the standard view, an assignment of formal real-
ity or real esse to that thing. This is precisely why Suárez, who takes beings of reason to possess 
esse objectivum, can nonetheless say that “a being of reason is such that esse cannot belong to it [ens 
autem rationis tale est, ut ei repugnat esse].”53 As this pronouncement makes clear, to say of some-
thing without qualification that it has esse is to assert that it has real or formal esse. To be sure, 
scholastics may not have agreed on the question of how esse objectivum (or esse spirituale or esse 
cognitum or esse repraesentatum or esse intelligibile) was related to esse reale. But all were agreed that 
esse objectivum was diminished (diminutum) or imperfect (imperfectum) in comparison with esse re-
ale.54 Again, this is precisely what motivates Descartes to concede in the Third Meditation that the 
“mode of being” (essendi modus) by which a thing exists objectively in the intellect is “imperfect” 
(AT VII, 41). In any case, whatever differences of opinion may have existed, all scholastics were 
agreed that something which exists only objectively in the human soul can be said to have esse 
only secundum quid, and not simpliciter—i.e., in a qualified sense, and not absolutely speaking. 
What’s more, Leibniz himself seems to endorse the view that esse objectivum is imperfect. For in a 
draft of his letter of 30 April 1687 to Arnauld, Leibniz likens the pair composed of the diamonds 
 
53 Disputationes metaphysicae, 54, 1, 10, in: Suárez: Opera omnia, vol. 26 (see note 40), p. 1018. (English 
translation: Suárez, On Beings of Reason (see note 40), pp. 65-66.) 
54 On this, see Armand Maurer: “Ens diminutum: A Note on its Origin and Meaning”, in: Mediaeval 
Studies XII (1950), pp. 216-22.  
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of the Grand Duke and the Great Mogul to various items (such as colours and parhelia) which, he 
says, have “a foundation in nature” but no “complete” (or “perfect”) “reality”—i.e., no “realité 
achevée” (A II, 2, 170). Moreover, that Leibniz takes esse objectivum to be imperfect is also clearly 
implied by what he says in some notes on Descartes’s Meditations, where he finds fault with Des-
cartes’s claim that, even if one were to suppose that what is contained objectively in an idea arises 
from another idea in which it is contained objectively, nevertheless, an infinite regress is impossi-
ble here (AT VII, 42). In particular, Leibniz asserts that Descartes needs to prove that such an infi-
nite regress is impossible, and he suggests that one ought, perhaps, to appeal to the principle that 
what is imperfect must arise from a cause in which it exists eminently or perfectly. From this it 
follows, he says, “that objective esse, which is imperfect, arises from formal esse, which is perfect” 
(A VI, 4, 1787 (1678-81?)). Leibniz, then, seems clearly to endorse the view that objective esse or 
reality is imperfect. It seems quite likely, therefore, that he would have regarded as false the un-
qualified claim that imaginary beings have reality. It seems, therefore, to be a mistake to suppose 
that, when Leibniz assigns reality to aggregates, the reality he has in mind is objective reality.  
It follows that the only way to make sense of the fact that in some texts Leibniz characterizes 
aggregates as imaginary beings, while in others he assigns reality to them, is to suppose that he is 
not altogether consistent in his use of the term ‘aggregate’ and related expressions. The sort of ag-
gregate that Leibniz characterizes as an imaginary being cannot be the kind of aggregate whose 
reality is, on his view, wholly derived from, and indeed identical to, the reality of the substances 
which figure in it.55  
How, then, does Leibniz conceive of this second sort of aggregate? The many texts in which 
Leibniz simply says that a body is not a being, but beings, or claims that a body is not a sub-
stance, but substances or an aggregate of substances, suggest that Leibniz often uses the term ‘ag-
gregate’ to refer to a perceiver-independent collection of substances that is nothing over and 
 
55 My impression is that Leibniz is more likely to use the expression ‘being by aggregation’ (note the 
singular ‘being’) to refer to the kind of aggregate that is an imaginary being. See the brief discussion of 
Jolley in note 5. 
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above those substances. For example, in one text Leibniz asserts that it is necessary to “distin-
guish between a substance and an aggregate of substances, between substance and substances 
[inter substantiam et substantias]” (LH 58). In another, he says that a “body is not a substance but 
substances, or an aggregate of substances” (“Fardella”, A VI, 4, 1670; AG, 105 (1690)). In yet an-
other, he says: “Every body, since it is composed of parts, is not truly one being, but many be-
ings” (A II, 2, 639; LTS, 100 (1693)). In a fourth he says: “Extension is an attribute, and the ex-
tended or matter is not a substance, but substances” (to De Volder, 6 July 1699, GP II, 183; LDV, 
105 (1699)). In a fifth, he says: “A monad alone is a substance, a body is substances, not a sub-
stance” (to De Volder, 21 January 1704, GP II, 262; LDV, 287 (1704)). In a sixth, he remarks: “Sec-
ondary matter, i.e., mass, is not a substance, but substances” (to Bernoulli, 1 September 1698, GM 
III, 537; LDV, 9). In a seventh, he observes: “The human being is a substance, his body or matter 
substances” (to Bernoulli, 17 December 1698, GM III, 560). In an eighth, he states: “matter […] is 
not a substance, but substances” (to Jacquelot, 22 March 1703, GP III, 457; WF, 20056). And in a 
ninth, he explains: “I suppose that what has no unity greater than the wood in a bundle or in a 
woodpile, or than bricks placed on top of one another, is not one being, but rather beings, alt-
hough a single name is given to them all” (“An corpora sint mera phaenomena” (1682-83?), A VI, 
4, 1464; LOC, 257).  
Such passages, in which Leibniz simply claims that a body or aggregate is many beings, sug-
gest a conception of aggregates as perceiver-independent pluralities, which, given Leibniz’s view 
that the relations among creatures are ideal, must, on his view, be collections that are nothing 
over and above the things contained within them. Indeed, the fact that Leibniz frequently states 
or implies that the reality of an aggregate is nothing other than the reality of its ingredients sug-
gests that on his view such an aggregate is nothing but its ingredients.57 Much the same conclu-
sion is suggested by the following passage from Leibniz’s letter 19 January 1706 to De Volder:  
 
56 WF = Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts, trans. R. S. Woolhouse and R. 
Francks, Oxford 1997. 
57 Cf. Paul Lodge’s introduction to LDV (see note 1), pp. lxxxiii-lxxxiv. 
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I am afraid that that force which is conceived in extension or bulk as outside of perceivers 
and their phenomena is of just this sort [i.e., utopian]. For there can be nothing real in na-
ture but simple substances and the aggregates that result from them. However, in these 
simple substances, we know nothing other than perceptions or reasons for perceptions. (GP 
II, 281-2; LDV, 331-3) 
 
Notice that the question at issue here is whether a particular sort of thing (the force which is con-
ceived to exist in extension or mass) is to be found “outside of perceivers and their phenomena.” 
At issue, in other words, is whether this entity is a third thing aside from simple substances and 
the representational contents of monadic perceptions. Leibniz’s answer is quite obviously no. 
Moreover, he justifies this answer with the claim that “there can be nothing real in nature but 
simple substances and the aggregates that result from them.”58 The clear implication is that the 
aggregates of simple substances that Leibniz has in mind here are not representational contents of 
monadic perceptions, unlike the pair of diamonds from the correspondence with Arnauld. Given 
this, and the description of aggregates as “real in nature,” the passage seems clearly to imply also 
that aggregates are here being conceived by Leibniz as perceiver-independent pluralities. Fur-
ther, Leibniz’s characterization of aggregates in this passage as “results” of simple substances is 
significant, for although Leibniz seems to use the term ‘result’ in different, more or less technical 
senses, nevertheless, in one text he writes that a result is something “which is immediately under-
stood [intelligitur] to be posited when those things from which it results have been posited” 
(“Definitiones: Aliquid, Nihil,” A VI, 4, 310 (1679?)). The idea here, I take it, is that nothing more 
is needed for the existence of a result than the existence of those things from which it results.59  
 
58 See also Leibniz to Remond, GP III, 622 (1714): “I believe that the entire universe of creatures con-
sists only in simple substances, or monads, and their collections [assemblages]”. 
59 Rutherford takes the occurrence of the term ‘understood’ (intelligitur) in this explanation of a re-
sult to indicate that for Leibniz the understanding plays an essential role in the coming-to-be of results. 
I think this is a mistake, for Leibniz frequently uses the term ‘intelligitur’ and related expressions in 
definitions where there can be no question of such a role for the understanding. Thus, in a text of 1677, 
Leibniz characterizes contingent things as things “in which no necessity is understood [intelligitur]” 
(“De veritatis realitate”, A VI, 4, 18). But Leibniz, surely, doesn’t hold that a thing’s status as contin-
gent depends on its being understood not to contain any necessity. Likewise, in a text thought to have 
been written in the first half of the 1680s, Leibniz explains that “A is prior, B posterior (sc. in the order 
of nature) if A is simpler to understand [simplicius intellectu] than B or when the possibility of A is more 
easily demonstrated than that of B” (“De notionibus omnia quae cogitamus continentibus”, A VI, 4, 
402). But Leibniz, surely, isn’t suggesting here that the intellect’s manner of conceiving things is 
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Also relevant to the question of how we should understand the aggregates which are said 
by Leibniz to have a reality derived from their ingredients is a passage that appears in his De 
mundo praesenti, which was probably written sometime between the Spring of 1684 and the Win-
ter of 1685/6:   
Every being [ens] is either real or imaginary. A real being is what is outside [citra60] the 
mind’s operation—for example the sun, about which we judge on the basis of an agree-
ment among several perceptions. An imaginary being—for example a rainbow, a parhelion 
or a dream—is what is perceived after the manner of a real being according to one mode of 
perceiving, but is not perceived and does not bear examination according to other modes of 
perceiving, as it should if it were a real being. […] 
Every real being is either a per se unity or a being per accidens. A being (unity) per se—for ex-
ample a human being; a being (unity) per accidens—for example a pile of wood or a machine, 
which is, of course, one only by aggregation […]. (A VI, 4, 1506; LOC, 283) 
 
Leibniz here distinguishes imaginary beings from real beings, implying that, unlike imaginary 
beings, real beings are outside, beyond, or apart from the mind’s operations—i.e., have a per-
ceiver-independent existence. What’s more, Leibniz explicitly classifies aggregates (or beings per 
accidens) as real beings, which implies that aggregates, too, are outside, beyond, or apart from the 
mind’s operations. Leibniz, in other words, must here be using the term ‘aggregate’ to refer to 
something that has a perceiver-independent existence, unlike the pair of diamonds from the cor-
respondence with Arnauld. Moreover, aggregates are here contrasted with the rainbow and the 
parhelion, which are offered as examples of imaginary beings and, in addition, are often cited by 
Leibniz as examples of phenomena, very often in the immediate wake of a declaration to the 
 
determinant of the fact that one thing is prior in the order of nature to another. The explanation of the 
resulting relation at A VI, 4, 310 is therefore reasonably taken not to imply any necessary role for the 
understanding in the existence of a result.  
60 Although ‘citra’ is commonly used to mean ‘on this side of’, and is so translated in LOC, the result-
ing English sentence either doesn’t make great sense or implies something that Leibniz would un-
doubtedly regard as false. ‘Beyond’, ‘outside’, ‘on the other side of’, ‘aside from’ and ‘apart from’ are 
among the alternative meanings of citra listed in: A. Souter, A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D., Oxford 
1949; A. Blaise, Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs du moyen-âge, Turnhout 1975; and L. Stelten, Dic-
tionary of Ecclesiastical Latin, Peabody, MA, 1995. Cf. Joannes Hebenstreit, Philosophia prima (see note 
40), 79-80: “Nimirum Ens vulgo sic solet describi: quod est extra nihil, quod vere & realiter existit, quod 
citra mentis operationem existit, h. e. quod existit, licet nulla creatura cogitet, illud existere, quod actu est, 
quod habet veram & realem existentiam” (my emphasis).  
Pre-publication draft 
 35 
effect that bodies are phenomena.61 To be sure, we shouldn’t understand Leibniz to be claiming in 
this passage that an aggregate is straightforwardly a real being. For a real being must, on his 
view, possess genuine or substantial unity, which is precisely what aggregates lack. But Leibniz’s 
view that aggregates—or some of the things he calls aggregates—possess the reality of their con-
stituents is in all likelihood why he here distinguishes aggregates from imaginary beings and 
places them alongside per se real beings. If this is right, it implies something that one would in 
any case naturally expect—namely, that for Leibniz imaginary beings lack the kind of reality that 
he often attributes to aggregates. Again, then, it seems that some of the things that Leibniz terms 
“aggregates” are conceived by him to be perceiver-independent pluralities. 
Also relevant here is a text in which Leibniz is concerned to define that which is constitutive 
(constitutivum) of something. A constitutivum, he explains, is by nature prior to that of which it is 
constitutive, immediately introducing it or positing it without any intervening consequence. It is 
in this way, he adds, that an aggregate, for instance a body, is posited by its ingredients.62 The im-
plication here, once again, is that the existence of the things that figure in an aggregate—or at 
least in the sort of aggregate whose reality is nothing but the reality of its ingredients—is suffi-
cient for the existence of that aggregate itself, which implies that such an aggregate is nothing 
more than the things which figure in it.63 
Finally, that Leibniz understands the aggregates whose reality is just the reality of their in-
gredients to be nothing but those ingredients is also suggested by something that he says in his 
“Considerations sur la doctrine d’un esprit universel unique” (1702). At one point in this text, 
Leibniz considers the view that God is like an ocean composed of infinitely many drops that are 
 
61 See, e.g., “Divisiones”, A VI, 4, 576 (1683-86?), Leibniz’s letter of 21 January 1704 to De Volder, GP 
II, 262; LDV, 287, his letter of 30 June 1704 to De Volder, GP II, 268; LDV, 303, his letter of 8 September 
1709 to Des Bosses, GP II, 390; LDB, 151-3, and his letter of 15 February 1712 to Des Bosses, GP II, 435-
6; LDB, 227.  
62 “Constitutivum autem est quod aliquid sine interveniente consequentia, seu immediate inferens 
natura prius. Ita ingredientia ponunt aggregatum ut corpus” (LH IV, 7 B, Bl. 56v). Quoted in M. Mug-
nai: “Leibniz’s Ontology of Relations: A Last Word?”, in: Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy VI 
(2012), pp. 171-208, at p. 195, n. 52.   
63 See Mugnai: “Leibniz’s Ontology of Relations” (see note 62), p. 194. 
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periodically detached from the entire mass in order to animate organic bodies, but later reunited 
with this mass when those bodies fail. With respect to this view, Leibniz remarks that, since an 
ocean is a collection [amas] of drops, God would, on this conception of him, be an assemblage [as-
semblage] of all souls, in which case one “would have to say that he is nothing at all in himself, 
and that there is in nature only the particular souls of which he is the collection [qu’il n’est rien du 
tout en soy, et qu’il n’y a dans la nature que les ames particulieres, dont il seroit l’amas]” (GP VI, 536; L, 
558). Now, Leibniz never uses the term ‘aggregate’ in this passage, but as every careful reader of 
him knows, he very often uses the French terms ‘amas’ and ‘assemblage’ as synonyms for ‘aggre-
gate.’ (Indeed, some translators use ‘aggregate’ to render Leibniz’s ‘amas’ into English.64) His 
claim in this passage, then, is that on this conception of God, God turns out to be an aggregate of 
all particular souls, in which case God will be “nothing at all in himself” and there will be noth-
ing in nature other than these particular souls of which God is the aggregate. The complete re-
duction of an aggregate to the things out of which it is aggregated, suggested here by the conclu-
sion that in this case God would be “nothing at all in himself,” seems clearly to entail that the ag-
gregate of all souls is identical with its members65. Much the same goes for the conclusion that in 
this case there would be “in nature only the particular souls of which [God] is the collection.” No-
tice also that there is no suggestion in this text that God, understood as an aggregate of all souls, 
would be a representational content or a hybrid of real and ideal elements.  
A careful reading of relevant texts, then, shows that Leibniz uses the term ‘aggregate’ and 
related expressions equivocally. Some of the things that he terms ‘aggregates of substances’ or 
‘beings by aggregation’ are representational contents, i.e., things that exist objectively in the 
mind. An aggregate, in this sense, is a real or well-founded phenomenon. To this extent, then, 
 
64 Leroy Loemker, for example, renders every occurrence of the term ‘amas’ in this passage (GP VI, 
535-36) as ‘aggregate’. See L 558.  
65 This is not to imply that one thing is identical to many. (Cf. Rutherford: “Leibniz as Idealist” (see 
note 9), p. 177.) To identify a Leibnizian aggregate with its members is to imply that one thing is iden-
tical to many only if a Leibnizian aggregate is one thing. But this is precisely what I’m concerned to 
deny when I claim that Leibniz sometimes uses the term ‘aggregate’ to refer to a collection that is noth-
ing over and above the individuals that figure in it.  
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Leibniz’s ostensibly competing characterizations of bodies—as aggregates, on the one hand, and 
as real or well-founded phenomena, on the other—can be reconciled: in some of the texts in which 
Leibniz describes bodies as aggregates, the aggregates he has in mind are none other than the real 
or well-founded phenomena with which he often identifies bodies. There are, however, other 
texts—texts in which Leibniz refers to bodies as aggregates—that cannot so easily be reconciled 
with the conception of bodies as phenomena. These include all those texts in which Leibniz both 
claims that a body is an aggregate and asserts that the reality of such an aggregate is wholly bor-
rowed from the substances that figure in it. An aggregate of this sort is not a phenomenon, nor 
something that exists only objectively in the intellect, nor the representational content of a per-
ception. Robert Adams’s solution to the problem of Leibniz’s inconsistent characterization of 
body is at best a partial solution, then. It leaves unanswered the question of how to understand 
the relation between Leibniz’s claim that bodies are real or well-founded phenomena and his fur-
ther claim that bodies are aggregates of substances that possess a reality derived from the unities 
contained within them. On the view that I’ve defended here, the latter claim serves as Leibniz’s 
rationale for the former claim: a body (sc. conceived as a being or single thing) is a real or well-
founded phenomenon because a parte rei or in reality a body is not a being, but many beings. 
Before leaving the topic of Leibniz’s use of the term ‘aggregate.’ it is worth noting that the 
fact that he sometimes uses this term to refer to the objective content of a perception, and some-
times also uses it to refer to a perceiver-independent plurality of substances, can help to explain 
why, in at least one text, he explicitly denies that matter is composed of substances. After all, alt-
hough aggregates, understood as perceiver-independent pluralities, can certainly be composed of 
genuine substances, the well-founded phenomena or imaginary beings that Leibniz sometimes 
refers to as “beings by aggregation” cannot—or so I have argued. It is, therefore, natural to expect 
that, in a context in which Leibniz is clearly conceiving of body or matter as a real or well-
founded phenomenon, he might deny that matter is composed of unities. And this is precisely 
what he does in a well-known passage from his letter of 30 June 1704 to De Volder: 
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Accurately speaking, however, matter is not composed of constitutive unities, but results 
from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon founded in things, 
like a rainbow or parhelion, and all reality belongs only to unities. Phenomena, therefore, 
can always be divided into smaller phenomena which can appear to other more subtle ani-
mals, nor does one ever arrive at the smallest phenomena. Substantial unities are not parts, 
but the foundations of phenomena. (GP II, 268; LDV, 303) 
 
In this passage Leibniz denies that matter is, “accurately speaking,” composed of unities; matter 
instead “results” from unities. (In this connection, it is important to remember that Leibniz does 
sometimes characterize phenomena or perceptions as “results.”66) Also important is Leibniz’s jus-
tification for this claim: “matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon founded in 
things, like a rainbow or parhelion.” The suggestion seems clearly to be that, pace Adams, a real 
or well-founded phenomenon is not the sort of thing that can be composed of unities or sub-
stances, even if it can result from them. Indeed, in this passage Leibniz also explains that matter is 
like a rainbow or parhelion—both of which he elsewhere classifies as imaginary beings, as we 
have seen—and then adds that all reality belongs only to unities. The point, I take it, is that mat-
ter, as conceived here, is an imaginary being and therefore cannot be composed of unities—i.e., of 
things that have reality; if it were somehow composed of unities, it would not after all be imagi-
nary, but real. In the second sentence of the passage, moreover, Leibniz adds that phenomena can 
always be divided into smaller phenomena that can serve as objects of perception for smaller ani-
mals. His point, it seems, is that in the division of matter one never arrives at unities, and this be-
cause matter, which is a phenomenon, is not after all composed of unities, but is related to them 
in some other way. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason, I would suggest, that in the final sen-
tence of our passage, Leibniz states that substantial unities “are not parts, but the foundations of 
phenomena.” The claim is that substantial unities are not after all constituents of extended matter 
but serve instead as the extra-mental objects of those perceptions which have extended matter as 
 
66 See, e.g., Leibniz’s letter of 4 June 1710 to Wagner, GP VII, 529, his letter of 9 October 1687 to Ar-
nauld, A II, 2, 241, and his letter of 29 May 1716 to Des Bosses, GP II, 520-21; LDB, 377-79. 
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their representation content. They are what make the phenomenon of matter real or well-
founded.67 
When Leibniz denies that matter is composed of unities, then, he is conceiving of matter as a 
phenomenon. This is not to say, however, that whenever Leibniz conceives of matter as a phenom-
enon, he denies that it is composed of unities. For, as the qualification “accurately speaking” 
might naturally be taken to suggest, in several texts in which Leibniz conceives of matter as ex-
tended, and therefore phenomenal, he speaks (sc. inaccurately) in ways that make monads out to 
be present in, and constituents of, extended bodies, which is not after all something that his sys-
tem permits. Thus, he is prepared to say that monads are “everywhere” in matter. And he is will-
ing to speak in this way notwithstanding his view that, when one considers what pertains to the 
nature of the simple substances or real unities out of which bodies are composed—i.e., perception 
and its consequences—“one is transported, so to speak, into another world, that is to say, into an 
intelligible world of substances, whereas before one was only among the phenomena of the 
senses” (Nouveaux essais, IV, 3, §6, A VI, 6, 378; NE, 378). 
It seems clear, then, that although Leibniz sometimes uses the term ‘aggregate’ and related 
expressions (e.g., ‘being by aggregation’) to refer to something that exists only objectively in per-
ceivers, when Leibniz speaks of how a body is an aggregates possessed of a reality that is wholly 
derived from, and indeed identical with, the reality of the substances contained in it, he does not 
 
67 Faced with this passage from Leibniz’s letter of 30 June 1704 to De Volder, Adams (whose position 
crucially depends on the view that for Leibniz a phenomenon or representational content can indeed 
be composed of monads) claims that Leibniz is not altogether consistent in his use of the term ‘com-
posed.’ Specifically, after noting that Leibniz commonly speaks of bodies as composed of monads, Ad-
ams appeals to a passage from the so-called ‘Fardella Memo’ in which Leibniz claims that substances 
do not constitute a body as parts do, since a part must be homogeneous with its whole (“Fardella”, A 
VI, 4, 1671/AG, 105). And he argues that when Leibniz, in his letter to De Volder, denies that matter is 
composed of parts, he has in mind a conception of composition that involves this requirement of ho-
mogeneity. (Hence the claim that substances are not parts, but the foundations of phenomena.) See 
Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (see note 6), pp. 242-44. This account seems problematic, 
first, because Leibniz never says anything to De Volder to signal that such a conception of composition 
is at work in the relevant passage, and second, because the invocation of the homogeneity requirement 
in the Fardella Memo is very clearly a response tailored to a particular concern of Fardella’s (see A VI, 
4, 1670/AG, 104). 
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have in mind something that exists only objectively in perceivers. He has in mind, rather, a per-
ceiver-independent collection of substances, which, given his commitment to the ideality of rela-
tions, can only be a collection which is nothing over and above those substances themselves. It is 




Against Donald Rutherford, I have argued in this paper that when Leibniz goes from the 
claim that a body is an aggregate to the conclusion that it is a phenomenon, the phenomena he 
has in mind are representational contents or things existing objectively in perceivers, and not hy-
brids of real and ideal elements. Indeed, it’s worth noting that Rutherford never addresses or 
considers the question that immediately presents itself for his view: how can relations, which ex-
ist only objectively in the mind, according to Leibniz, combine with genuine substances, which 
have esse reale outside the mind, in such a way as to give rise to something that is mind-depend-
ent and possessed of a reality that attaches to real beings independently of their being perceived? 
It is not unreasonable to doubt whether Leibniz would have countenanced such a thing. 
This conclusion, when taken together with the conclusion of the last section, implies that the 
solution to the problem posed by Leibniz’s apparently competing characterizations of body is not 
to be solved by supposing that one and the same thing can be, according to Leibniz, both a phe-
nomenon and an aggregate of substances which possesses the reality of its constituents. The solu-
tion to this problem must therefore be found elsewhere. In Part II of this paper, I will present my 
own proposed solution, offer arguments for it, and consider its consequences.  
